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 51 
Abstract 52 
The present paper draws on climate science and the philosophy of science in order to 53 
evaluate climate-model-based approaches to assessing climate projections. We 54 
analyze the difficulties that arise in such assessment and outline criteria of adequacy 55 
for approaches to it. In addition, we offer a critical overview of the approaches used in 56 
the IPCC working group one fourth report, including the confidence building, 57 
Bayesian and likelihood approaches. Finally, we consider approaches that do not 58 
feature in the IPCC reports, including three approaches drawn from the philosophy of 59 
science. We find that all available approaches face substantial challenges, with IPCC 60 
approaches having as a primary source of difficulty their goal of providing 61 
probabilistic assessments. 62 
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1. Introduction 84 
The climate system is the system of processes that underlie the behavior of 85 
atmospheric, oceanic and cryospheric phenomena such as atmospheric temperature, 86 
precipitation, sea-ice extent and ocean salinity.  Climate models are designed to 87 
simulate the seasonal and longer term behavior of the climate system. They are 88 
mathematical, computer implemented representations that comprise two kinds of 89 
elements. They comprise basic physical theory – e.g., conservation principles such as 90 
conservation of momentum and heat – that is used explicitly to describe the evolution 91 
of some physical quantities – e.g., temperature, wind velocity and properties of water 92 
vapor. Climate models also comprise parameterizations. Parameterizations are 93 
substitutes for explicit representations of physical processes, substitutes that are used 94 
where lack of knowledge and/or limitations in computational resources make explicit 95 
representation impossible. Individual cloud formation, for example, typically occurs 96 
on a scale that is much smaller than global climate model (GCM) resolution and thus 97 
cannot be explicitly resolved. Instead, parameterizations capturing assumed 98 
relationships between model grid-average quantities and cloud properties are used. 99 
The basic theory of a climate model can be formulated using equations for the 100 
time derivatives of the model’s state vector variables, xi, i = 1, ..., n, as is 101 
schematically represented by 102 
)(),,...,,...( 11 tGtyyxxF
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      (1)   103 
In Eqt. (1), t denotes time, the functions Gi represent external forcing factors 104 
and how these function together to change the state vector quantities, and the Fi  105 
represent the many physical, chemical and biological factors in the climate system and 106 
how these function together to change the state vector quantities. External forcing 107 
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factors – e.g., greenhouse gas concentrations, solar irradiance strength, anthropogenic 108 
aerosol concentrations and volcanic aerosol optical depth – are factors that might 109 
affect the climate system but that are, or are treated as being, external to this system. 110 
The xi represent those quantities the evolution of which is explicitly described 111 
by basic theory, that is the evolution of which is captured by partial time derivatives. 112 
The yi represent quantities that are not explicitly described by basic theory. So these 113 
variables must be treated as functions of the xi, i.e., the yi must be parameterized. In 114 
this case, the parameterizations are schematically represented in Eqt. (2). 115 
 
y i = Hi(x1,...,xn )        (2) 116 
Given initial conditions xi(t0) at time t = t0 and boundary conditions, the climate 117 
model calculates values of the state vector at a later time  t = t1 in accordance with 118 
Eqt. (1). 119 
Climate models play an essential role in identifying the causes of climate 120 
change and in generating projections. Projections are conditional predictions of 121 
climatic quantities. Each projection tells us how one or more such quantities would 122 
evolve were external forcing to be at certain levels in the future. Some approaches to 123 
assessing projections derive projections, and assess their quality, at least partly 124 
independently of climate models. They might, for example, use observations to decide 125 
how to extend simulations of present climate into the future (Stott et al., 2006) or 126 
derive projections from, and assess them on the basis of, observations (Bentley, 2010; 127 
Siddall et al., 2010). We focus on climate-model-based assessment. Such assessment 128 
is of the projections of one or more climate models and is assessment in which how 129 
good models are in some respect or another is used to determine projection quality. A 130 
climate model projection (CMP) quality is a qualitative or quantitative measure, such 131 
as a probability, that is indicative of what we should suppose about CMP accuracy. 132 
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It is well recognized within the climate science community that climate-133 
model-based assessment of projection quality needs to take into account the effects of 134 
climate model limitations on projection accuracy (Randall et al., 2007; Smith, 2006; 135 
Stainforth et al., 2007a). Following Smith (2006) and Stainforth (2007a), we 136 
distinguish between the following main types of climate model limitations: 137 
(a) External forcing inaccuracy – inaccuracy in a model's representation of 138 
external forcing, that is in the Gi in Eqt. (1).  139 
 140 
(b) Initial condition inaccuracy – inaccuracy in the data used to initialize 141 
climate model simulations, that is in the xi(t0).  142 
 143 
(c) Model imperfection – limitations in a model's representation of the climate 144 
system or in our knowledge of how to construct this representation, 145 
including: 146 
 147 
1. Model parameterization limitations – limitations in our knowledge of 148 
what the optimal or the appropriate parameter values and parameterization 149 
schemes for a model are. This amounts, in the special case where 150 
parameterizations are captured by Eqt. (2), to limitations in our knowledge 151 
of which functions Hi one should include from among available 152 
alternatives. 153 
 154 
2. Structural inadequacy – inaccuracy in how a model represents the 155 
climate system which cannot be compensated for by resetting model 156 
parameters or replacing model parameterizations with other available 157 
parameterization schemes. Structural inaccuracy in Eqt. (1) is manifested 158 
in an insufficient number of variables xi and yi as well as in the need for 159 
new functions of these variables. 160 
 161 
Parameterization limitations are illustrated by the enduring uncertainty about climate 162 
sensitivity and associated model parameters and parameterization schemes. A 163 
relatively recent review of climate sensitivity estimates underscores the limited ability 164 
to determine its upper bound as well as the persistent difficulty in narrowing its likely 165 
range beyond 2 to 4.5 °C (Knutti and Hegerl, 2008). The 21 GCMs used by Working 166 
Group One of the IPCC fourth report (WG1 AR4) illustrate structural inadequacy. 167 
These sophisticated models are the models of the World Climate Research 168 
Programme's  Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 (CMIP3) (Meehl et al., 169 
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2007a). Some important sub-grid and larger than grid phenomena that are relevant to 170 
the evolution of the climate system are not accurately represented by these models, 171 
some are only represented by a few of the models and some are not represented at all. 172 
Parameterization of cloud formation, for example, is such that even the best available 173 
parameterizations suffer from substantial limitations (Randall et al., 2003). None of 174 
the models represent the carbon cycle, only some represent the indirect aerosol effect 175 
and only two represent stratospheric chemistry (CMIP3, 2007). The models also omit 176 
many of the important effects of land use change (Mahmood et al., 2010; Pielke, 177 
2005). Many of their limitations, e.g., the limited ability to represent surface heat 178 
fluxes as well as sea ice distribution and seasonal changes, are the result of a 179 
combination of structural inadequacy and parameterization limitations (Randall et al., 180 
2007, p. 616). CMIP3 simulations illustrate initial condition inaccuracy. Due to 181 
constraints of computational power and to limited observations, these simulations start 182 
from selected points of control integrations rather than from actual observations of 183 
historical climate (Hurrell et al., 2009). 184 
 The most ambitious assessments of projection quality, and these are primarily 185 
climate-model-based assessments, are those of WG1. The first three WG1 reports rely 186 
primarily on the climate-model-based approach that we will call the confidence 187 
building approach. This is an informal approach that aims to establish confidence in 188 
models, and thereby in their projections, by appealing to models’ physical basis and 189 
success at representing observed and past climate. In the first two reports, however, 190 
no uniform view about what confidence in models teaches about CMP quality is 191 
adopted (IPCC 1990; IPCC 1996). The summary for policymakers in the WG1 192 
contribution to the IPCC first assessment report, for example, qualifies projections 193 
using diverse phrases such as 'we predict that', ‘confidence is low that’ and ‘it is likely 194 
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that’ (IPCC 1990). A more systematic view is found in WG1's contribution to the 195 
third IPCC assessment report (WG1 TAR). It made use of a guidance note to authors 196 
which recommends that main results be qualified by degrees of confidence that are 197 
calibrated to probability ranges (Moss and Schneider, 2000). The summary for 198 
policymakers provided by WG1 TAR does assign projections such degrees of 199 
confidence. It expresses degrees of confidence as degrees of likelihood and takes, e.g., 200 
'very likely' to mean having a chance between 90 and 99 %, and 'likely' to mean 201 
having a chance between 66 % and 90 %. The chapter on projections of future climate 202 
change, however, defines degrees of confidence in terms of agreement between 203 
models. A very likely projection, for example, is defined (roughly) as one that is 204 
physically plausible and is agreed upon by all models used (IPCC 2001). 205 
WG1 AR4’s assessment of projection quality has two stages. First, confidence 206 
in models is established as in previous reports. This is mostly achieved in Chapter 8 – 207 
which describes, among other things, successful simulations of natural variability 208 
(Randall et al., 2007) – and in chapter 9 – which focuses on identifying the causes of 209 
climate change, but also characterizes model successes at simulating 20th century 210 
climate change (Hegerl et al., 2007). The second stage is carried out in Chapter 10 – 211 
which provides WG1 AR4’s global projections (Meehl et al., 2007b) – and Chapter 11 212 
– which focuses on regional projections (Christensen et al., 2007). In these chapters, 213 
expert judgment is used to assign qualities to projections given established confidence 214 
in models and the results of formal, probabilistic projection assessment (Meehl et al., 215 
2007b). WG1 AR4 is the first WG1 report that makes extensive use of formal 216 
assessment, though it recognizes that such approaches are in their infancy 217 
(Christensen et al., 2007; Randall et al., 2007). Both climate-model-based and partly 218 
climate-model-independent formal approaches are used. 219 
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Although WG1 AR4 assesses models using degrees of confidence, it does not 220 
assess projections in these terms. Nor does it equate projection likelihoods with 221 
degrees of agreement among models. It does, however, implement the advice to 222 
provide probabilistically calibrated likelihoods of projections (IPCC 2005). For 223 
example, unlike WG1 TAR, WG1 AR4 provides explicit likelihood estimates for 224 
projected ranges of global mean surface temperature (GMST) changes. It estimates 225 
that the increase in GMST by the end of the century is likely to fall within -40 to +60 226 
% of the average GCM warming simulated for each emission scenario and provides 227 
broader uncertainty margins than the GCM ensemble in particular because GCMs do 228 
not capture uncertainty in the carbon cycle (Fig. 2). 229 
The sophistication of WG1 AR4’s assessments was enabled by the increasing 230 
ability to use multi-GCM and perturbed physics GCM ensembles. Thus, while WG1’s 231 
first two reports relied on simple models to produce long term GMST projections, 232 
WG1 TAR and WG1 AR4 relied primarily on state-of-the-art GCM ensembles to 233 
assess these and other projections. WG1 AR4 nevertheless still relied on simpler 234 
models, including intermediate complexity and energy balance models (Randall et al., 235 
2007). 236 
In this review, we provide a critical discussion of the (climate-model-based) 237 
approaches to assessing projection quality relied on in WG1 AR4 and more recent 238 
work by climate scientists. In doing so, we build on the substantial climate science 239 
literature, including WG1 AR4 itself. We, however, extend this literature using the 240 
perspective of the philosophy of science. Our discussion does focus more than climate 241 
scientists themselves tend to on precisely why assessing projection quality is difficult, 242 
on what is required of an adequate approach to such assessment and on the limitations 243 
of existing approaches. We, nevertheless, also address some of the practical concerns 244 
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of climate scientists. We outline three views of how to assess scientific claims that are 245 
drawn from the philosophy of science and consider how they might further assist in 246 
assessing projection quality. Important issues that space does not allow us to address 247 
are the special difficulties that assessment of regional projection quality raises. An 248 
issue that deserves more attention than we have given it is that of how uncertainty 249 
about data complicates assessing projection quality. 250 
We begin (Section 2) by considering what kinds of qualities should be 251 
assigned to projections, especially whether probabilistic qualities should be assigned. 252 
We then (Section 3) discuss why assessing projection quality is difficult and outline 253 
criteria for adequate approaches to doing so. Using these criteria, we proceed to 254 
discuss (Sections 4–7) the approaches that were used in WG1 AR4, namely the 255 
confidence building, the subjective Bayesian and the likelihood approaches. Finally 256 
(Section 8), we discuss approaches that are not used, or are not prominent in, WG1 257 
AR4, including the possibilist and three philosophy-of-science-based approaches. 258 
 259 
2. Probabilistic and non-probabilistic assessment 260 
Probabilistic assessment of projection quality will here be taken to include assigning 261 
probabilities or informative probability ranges to projections or projection ranges. 262 
Such assessment has been argued for on the ground that it is better suited to handling 263 
the inevitable uncertainty about projections than deterministic assessments are 264 
(Raisanen and Palmer, 2001). But philosophers of science, computer scientists and 265 
others point out that probabilities fail to represent uncertainty when ignorance is deep 266 
enough (Halpern, 2003; Norton, 2011). Assigning a probability to a prediction 267 
involves, given standard probability frameworks, specifying the space of possible 268 
outcomes as well as the chances that the predicted outcomes will obtain. These, 269 
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however, are things we may well be uncertain about given sufficient ignorance. For 270 
example, we might be trying to assess the probability that a die will land on '6' when 271 
our information about the kind and bias of the die is limited. We might have the 272 
information that it can exhibit the numerals '1', '6' and '8' as well as the symbol '*', but 273 
not have any information about what other symbols might be exhibited or, beyond the 274 
information that '6' has a greater chance of occurring than the other known symbols, 275 
the chances of symbols being exhibited. The die need not be a six sided die. In such 276 
circumstances, it appears that assigning a probability to the outcome '6' will 277 
misrepresent our uncertainty. 278 
Assigning probability ranges and probabilities to ranges can face the same 279 
difficulties as assigning probabilities to single predictions. In the above example, 280 
uncertainty about the space of possibilities is such that it would be inappropriate to 281 
assign the outcome '6' a range that is more informative than the unhelpful 'somewhere 282 
between 0 and 1'. The same is true about assigning the range of outcomes '1', '6' and 283 
'8' a probability. 284 
One might suggest that, at least when the possible states of a system are 285 
known, we should apply the principle of indifference. According to this principle, 286 
where knowledge does not suffice to decide between possibilities in an outcome 287 
space, they should be assigned equal probabilities. Some work in climate science 288 
acknowledges that this principle is problematic, but suggests that it can be applied 289 
with suitable caution (Frame et al., 2005). Most philosophers argue that the principle 290 
should be rejected (Strevens, 2006a). We cannot know that the principle of 291 
indifference will yield reliable predictions when properly applied (North, 2010). If, 292 
for example, we aim to represent complete ignorance of what value climate sensitivity 293 
has within the range 2 to 4.5 °C, it is natural to assign equal probabilities to values in 294 
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this range. Yet whether doing so is reliable across scenarios in which greenhouse 295 
gasses double depends on what climate sensitivity actually tends to be across such 296 
scenarios and it is knowledge of this tendency that is, given the assumed ignorance, 297 
lacking. Further, we can only define a probability distribution given a description of 298 
an outcome space and there is no non-arbitrary way of describing such a space under 299 
ignorance (Norton, 2008; Strevens, 2006a). What probability should we assign to 300 
climate sensitivity's being between 2 and 4 °C, given complete ignorance within the 301 
range 2 to 6 °C? 50 % is the answer, when the outcome space is taken to be the given 302 
climate sensitivity range and outcomes are treated as equiprobable. But other answers 303 
are correct if alternative outcome spaces are selected, say if the outcome space is 304 
taken to be a function not just of climate sensitivity but also of feedbacks upon which 305 
climate sensitivity depends. And in the supposed state of ignorance about climate 306 
sensitivity, we will not have a principled way of selecting a single outcome space. 307 
Although the case of the die is artificial, our knowledge in it does share some 308 
features with our knowledge of the climate system. We are, for example, uncertain 309 
about what possible states the climate system might exhibit, as already stated in the 310 
case of climate sensitivity. A central question in what follows is to what extent our 311 
ignorance of the climate system is such that probabilistic assessment of projection 312 
quality is inappropriate. 313 
Acknowledging that probabilistic assessment is inappropriate in some case is 314 
by no means then to give up on assessment. Assigning non-probabilistic qualities can 315 
commit us to less than assigning probabilities or probability ranges and thus can better 316 
represent uncertainty. Judging that it is a real possibility that climate sensitivity is 2 317 
°C does not require taking a position on the full range of climate sensitivity. Nor need 318 
rankings of climate sensitivities according to plausibility do so. Other non-319 
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probabilistic qualities the assignment of which is less demanding than that of 320 
probabilities or probability ranges are sets of probability ranges and the degree to 321 
which claims have withstood severe tests (see Halpern (2003) for a discussion, and 322 
formal treatment, of a variety of non-probabilistic qualities. We discuss severe-test-323 
based and real-possibility-based assessments in sections 8.4 and 8.1 respectively). 324 
 325 
3. Why is assessing projection quality difficult? 326 
Projections, recall, are predictions that are conditional on assumptions about external 327 
forcing. So errors in assumptions about external forcing are not relevant to assessing 328 
projection quality. Such assessment need only take into account the effects of initial 329 
condition inaccuracy and model imperfection. In the present section, we consider why 330 
these kinds of limitations make assessing projection quality difficult. This question is 331 
not answered just by noting that climate models have limitations. Scientific models 332 
are in general limited, but it is not generally true that assessing their predictions is a 333 
serious problem. Consider standard Newtonian models of the Earth-Sun system. Such 334 
models suffer from structural inadequacy. They represent the Earth and the Sun as 335 
point masses. Moreover, they tell us that the Earth and the Sun exert gravitational 336 
forces on each other, something that general relativity assures us is not strictly true. 337 
Still, assessing to what extent we can trust the predictions these models are used to 338 
generate is something we typically know how to do. 339 
 340 
3.1 Initial condition inaccuracy and its impact on assessing projections 341 
We begin by considering the difficulties associated with initial condition error. Work 342 
in climate science emphasizes the highly nonlinear nature of the climate system (Le 343 
Treut et al., 2007; Rial et al., 2004), a nature that is reflected in the typically nonlinear 344 
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form of the Fi in Eqt. (1). Nonlinear systems are systems in which slight changes to 345 
initial conditions can give rise to non-proportional changes of quantities over time 346 
(Lorenz, 1963). This high sensitivity can make accurate prediction inherently difficult. 347 
Any errors in simulations of highly nonlinear systems, including even minor errors in 348 
initial condition settings, might be multiplied over time quickly. The high sensitivity 349 
to initial conditions also, as climate scientists note, threatens to make assessing 350 
prediction quality difficult. The way in which error grows over time in such systems 351 
cannot be assumed to be linear and might depend on how the system itself develops 352 
(Palmer, 2000; Palmer et al., 2005). 353 
 However, how serious a problem sensitivity to initial conditions is for 354 
assessing projection quality is not a straightforward matter. The known inaccuracy in 355 
model initial condition settings means that high sensitivity of the evolution of climatic 356 
quantities to initial conditions might be important. Yet, a climatic quantity the 357 
evolution of which is going to be highly nonlinear at one temporal scale may continue 358 
to exhibit approximately linear evolution on another such scale. Greenland ice volume 359 
may, for example, evolve linearly in time over the coming few decades but 360 
nonlinearly over more than three centuries (Lenton et al., 2008). If this is so, 361 
nonlinearity will only be a limited obstacle to assessing projections of Greenland ice 362 
volume. More generally, whether, and to what extent, a climatic process is nonlinear 363 
will depend on the desired projection accuracy, the quantity of interest, the actual 364 
period and region of interest and the temporal and spatial scale of interest (IPCC 365 
2001). Thus, whether the highly nonlinear behavior of the climate system is a problem 366 
for assessing projection quality will have to be determined on a case by case basis. 367 
 368 
3.2 Tuning and its impact on assessing projections 369 
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Further features of climate modeling complicate determining the impact of model 370 
imperfection on CMP quality. The first of these features is tuning. Tuning is the 371 
modification of parameterization scheme parameters so as to accommodate – create 372 
agreement with – old data. A prominent instance is the setting of parameters 373 
associated with the small-scale mixing processes in the ocean. Tuning to current day 374 
conditions is hard to avoid given the limited available data about the climate system. 375 
Moreover, climate scientists worry that when model success results from 376 
accommodation, it provides less confirmation of model abilities than success that 377 
results from out-of-sample prediction, that is from prediction that is made prior to the 378 
availability of the data but that nevertheless accurately captures the data (Knutti, 379 
2008; Smith, 2006; Stainforth et al., 2007a). Prominently, there is the suspicion that 380 
accommodation threatens to guarantee success irrespective of whether models 381 
correctly capture those underlying processes within the climate system that are 382 
relevant to its long term evolution (Schwartz et al., 2007). This impacts assessing 383 
projection quality. Difficulty in assessing the extent to which a model's basic 384 
assumptions hold will give rise to difficulty in assessing its projections. 385 
 Work in the philosophy of science, however, shows that whether, and under 386 
what conditions, the accommodation of data provides reduced confirmation is an 387 
unresolved one (Barrett and Stanford, 2006). On the one hand, some philosophers do 388 
worry that accommodation raises the threat of generating empirical success 389 
irrespective of whether one’s theoretical assumptions are correct (Worrall, 2010). On 390 
the other hand, if we prioritize out-of-sample prediction over accommodation, 391 
evidence might be good evidence of the suitability of model A for generating a set of 392 
projections R for the late 21st century and not so good evidence for the suitability of 393 
model B for this purpose even though the models are intrinsically identical. This 394 
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might occur because the developers of model B happen to learn, while those of A do 395 
not learn, of relevant evidence at the stage of model development. In such 396 
circumstances, the developers of B might end up accommodating the evidence while 397 
the developers of A successfully predict it. Resulting differing degrees of confidence 398 
in the models would, paradoxically, have to be maintained even if it were recognized 399 
that the models are intrinsically identical. If accommodated evidence as such is poor 400 
evidence, what determines whether evidence is good evidence for a model is the 401 
model's history and not just its intrinsic characteristics (see, e.g., Hudson (2007) for 402 
worries about the value of out-of-sample prediction). 403 
 Unfortunately, while the philosophy of science literature tells us that tuning 404 
might not be so bad, it still leaves open the possibility that it is problematic. So how 405 
tuning affects CMP accuracy still needs to be addressed. 406 
 Of course, different approaches to parameterization affect CMP quality 407 
differently. For example, stochastic parameterizations, i.e., parameterizations that 408 
introduce small but random variations in certain model parameters or variables, are 409 
arguably sometimes better than standard deterministic parameterizations (Palmer et 410 
al., 2005). The worries about tuning, however, arise for all available parameterization 411 
techniques. 412 
 413 
3.3 The long term nature of projections and its impact on assessing projections 414 
A second factor that, according to some climate scientists, complicates determining 415 
the impact of model imperfection is the fact that climate models cannot be tested 416 
repeatedly across relevant temporal domains (Frame et al., 2007; Knutti, 2008). We 417 
can repeatedly compare weather model forecasts with observations. Success 418 
frequencies can then be used to provide probabilistic estimates of model fitness for the 419 
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purpose of generating accurate forecasts. Recently, some old CMPs have been directly 420 
assessed (Hargreaves, 2010). But many CMPs have fulfillment conditions that are 421 
never realized and, anyway, CMPs are generally too long term to allow repeated 422 
direct testing. Thus, it has been argued, it is hard to take the impact of many model 423 
implemented assumptions about long term climate into account in assessing model 424 
suitability for generating projections. 425 
But the fact that we cannot test our models’ predictions over the time scales of 426 
the predictions is not itself a difficulty. Consider predictions of Earth orbit variation 427 
induced changes in solar radiation at the top of atmosphere over the next million 428 
years. Here, predictions are generated using model implemented theory about orbital 429 
physics, including Newtonian mechanics and an understanding of its limitations 430 
(Laskar et al., 2004). This theory is what grounds confidence in the predictions, 431 
though the theory and the models based upon it are only tested against relatively 432 
short-term data. As the general views we will discuss about how scientific claims are 433 
assessed illustrate, there is no need to assume that estimates of a model’s ability must 434 
be, or are, made on the basis of numerous observations of how well the model has 435 
done in the past. 436 
 437 
3.4 Basic theory, recognized model imperfection and assessing projections 438 
There are nevertheless two more factors other than tuning that complicate taking into 439 
account the effects of model imperfection in assessing projection quality. The first, 440 
which is not explicitly discussed in the climate science literature but which climate 441 
scientists no doubt recognize, is the combination of known model imperfection with 442 
the fact that the background knowledge used in constructing models provides a 443 
limited constraint on model construction. 444 
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Philosophers of science observe that theory provides essential information 445 
about model reliability (Humphreys, 2004). Newtonian physics, general relativity and 446 
other theories provide essential information about when, and to what extent, we can 447 
neglect aspects of the solar system in applying Newtonian theory to model the orbit of 448 
the Earth. The same, we have noted, is true of models of how changes in the Earth's 449 
orbit affect top of the atmosphere solar radiation. In the case of climate modeling, 450 
however, the extent to which theory can guide climate model construction and 451 
projection quality assessment is limited. After all, parameterization is introduced 452 
precisely because of a limited ability to apply explicit theory in model construction.  453 
We do not, for example, have a quantitative theory of the main mechanisms of 454 
the stratospheric circulation. As a result, while our partial understanding of these 455 
mechanisms can be used in arguing that  CMIP3 GCMs’ limited ability to represent 456 
the stratosphere adversely affects their simulations of tropospheric climate change, the 457 
way and extent to which it does so will remain a matter of ongoing investigation (as 458 
in, e.g., Dall' Amico (2010)). 459 
A limited ability to apply theory in model construction will even make it 460 
difficult to decide what we can learn about CMP accuracy from whatever success 461 
models have. For easy, relatively theory neutral, ways of drawing conclusions from 462 
model successes are hard to come by given model imperfection.  463 
Model imperfection implies that models will only have limited empirical 464 
success, as indeed is found in the case of climate models. The strongest claim reported 465 
by WG1 AR4 on behalf of simulated GCM multi-model annual mean surface 466 
temperatures is that, outside of data poor regions such as the polar regions, simulated 467 
temperatures were usually within 2 °C of observed temperatures. For most latitudes, 468 
the error in simulated zonally averaged outgoing shortwave radiation was about 6%. 469 
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Simulation of the strength of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC) 470 
suffers from substantial inaccuracies (Fig. 3). And the same is true of simulation of 471 
precipitation patterns, especially on regional scales (Randall et al., 2007). Such 472 
inaccuracies short-circuit a simple argument for assigning a high quality to CMPs, 473 
namely one that assigns them such a quality on the ground that they were generated 474 
by models which simulate data well across the board. Indeed, there is reason to think 475 
that increased ability to simulate the current mean climate state across large sets of 476 
climate variables is a limited constraint on CMP accuracy (Abe et al., 2009; Knutti et 477 
al., 2010). For example, it has been shown (Knutti et al., 2010) that the range of 478 
CMPs of precipitation trends is not substantially affected by whether it is produced by 479 
all the CMIP3 models or by a subset of high performing models. Assessment of a 480 
projection's quality requires correctly identifying which, if any, aspects of model 481 
performance are relevant to the projection's accuracy. 482 
 Further difficulty in figuring out what to infer from what model success there 483 
is arises from the well recognized interdependency of climatic processes. Changes in 484 
some climatic processes inevitably give rise to changes in others. Changes in cloud 485 
cover, land usage, soil hydrology, boundary layer structure and aerosols will, for 486 
example, affect surface temperature trends and vice versa. Thus, an accurate 487 
simulation of some quantity x will require an appropriate simulation of related 488 
quantities upon which x depends. And our assessment of the quality of a projection of 489 
x will have to take into account both the accuracy with which x has been simulated 490 
and the accuracy with which related quantities have been simulated. One cannot 491 
simply argue that since some models simulate a certain climatic quantity well, their 492 
projections of this quantity are good (Parker, 2009). 493 
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Easy, relatively theory neutral ways of assessing what to infer from limited 494 
model successes might also be hampered by structural instability, which is, like high 495 
sensitivity to changes in initial conditions, a feature of nonlinear systems. A system is 496 
structurally unstable when slight changes to its underlying dynamics would give rise 497 
to qualitatively different system evolutions. Components of the climate system do 498 
exhibit structural instability (Ghil et al., 2008; McWilliams, 2007). This means that 499 
minor observed errors in simulating current climate might, given model imperfection, 500 
lead to substantial errors in CMPs. 501 
 502 
3.5 Unrecognized model imperfection and assessing projections 503 
The final source of difficulty for assessing projection quality in light of model 504 
imperfection is the possibility, worried about by scientists from all fields, that our 505 
models are wrong in unrecognized ways. Empirically successful theories and models 506 
have often turned out to rest on mistaken assumptions about which theoretical – that is 507 
not directly observable – processes and entities explain observable phenomena 508 
(Laudan, 1981). This is true of theories and models of the climate system. Prior to the 509 
1990s, for example, climate models that were used to provide spatial simulations of 510 
global surface temperatures did not include a representation of the role of aerosols in 511 
the climate system and this turned out to be a surprisingly substantial incompleteness 512 
in the simulations (Wigley, 1994). Moreover, current candidates for substantially 513 
underestimated forcing, feedbacks and internal variability exist (e.g., terrestrial 514 
biogeochemical feedbacks (Arneth et al., 2010) and feedbacks amplifying the effects 515 
of solar luminosity (Kirkby, 2007)). 516 
Some philosophers have concluded, largely on the basis of the history of 517 
successful but superseded theories and models, that a theory or model's predictive 518 
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success should not be used to justify belief in what the theory or model tells us about 519 
theoretical entities and processes (see, e.g., Stanford (2006)). On their view, theories 520 
and models should be taken to be no more than tools for predicting observable 521 
phenomena. The sad truth, however, is that it is currently unclear what we are entitled 522 
to assume about how complete empirically successful theories and models are (see 523 
Saatsi (2005) and Psillos (1999) for two of many further alternative perspectives on 524 
this unresolved issue). In particular, it is unclear what we are entitled to assume about 525 
how complete climate models and our knowledge of the climate system are, including 526 
about how complete our knowledge of climatic factors that are materially relevant to 527 
CMP accuracy is. This complicates assessment. For example, difficulty in estimating 528 
the completeness of GCMs' representations of the effects of solar luminosity 529 
fluctuations means difficulty in assessing projections of GMST trends. 530 
 531 
3.6 Criteria of adequacy for approaches to assessing projections 532 
Our discussion of why assessing projection quality is difficult helps to spell out 533 
criteria of adequacy for approaches to such assessment. Adequate approaches will, 534 
given initial condition inaccuracy, have to assess projection quality in light of the 535 
possible path dependent nature of error propagation. Given the inevitable use of 536 
parameterization, they will have to take the possible effects of tuning into account. 537 
They will also have to take the impact of model imperfection into account. Doing so 538 
involves paying attention to climate models’ limited ability to simulate climate, to the 539 
difficulty in determining which aspects of model empirical success are relevant to 540 
assessing which projections, to the interdependence of the evolution of climatic 541 
quantities along with the effect of this interdependence on error propagation and to 542 
possible structural instability. Doing so also requires attending to the history induced 543 
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lack of clarity about unrecognized model imperfection. If the claim is that we are 544 
entitled to ignore the history of successful but superseded models and thus to cease 545 
worrying about unrecognized model imperfection, we need to be told why. Otherwise, 546 
the impact of unrecognized climate model limitations on the accuracy of their 547 
projections needs to be taken into account. 548 
 Since we know that only some of the projections of climate models will be 549 
accurate, an adequate approach to assessing projection quality will have to provide 550 
projection (or class of projections) specific assessments (Gleckler et al., 2008; Parker, 551 
2009). It should judge the quality of a CMP on the basis of how fit the model or 552 
models which generated it are for the purpose of doing so, i.e., for the purpose of 553 
correctly answering the question the CMP answers. 554 
  555 
4. The confidence building approach 556 
We now discuss the confidence building approach to assessing projection quality. 557 
This approach, recall, focuses on what model agreement with physical theory as well 558 
as model simulation accuracy confirm. Better grounding in physical theory and 559 
increased accuracy in simulation of observed and past climate is used to increase 560 
confidence in models and hence in CMPs. Given the emphasis on grounding in 561 
physical theory, the reliance here is primarily on GCMs.  562 
In the uncertainty assessment guidance note for WG1 AR4 lead authors, 563 
degrees of confidence in models are interpreted probabilistically. Specifically, they 564 
are calibrated to chance ranges, e.g., very high confidence in a model is interpreted as 565 
its having an at least 9 in 10 chance of being correct (IPCC 2005). The chance that a 566 
model is correct can be thought of as the model’s propensity to yield correct results 567 
with a certain frequency, but neither the guidance note nor the report itself indicate 568 
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how chances should be interpreted. Indeed, they do not indicate how the talk of 569 
chances of models' being correct relates to the talk of CMP likelihoods, and the report 570 
does not go beyond establishing increased confidence in models in order to assign 571 
them specific degrees of confidence. This last fact makes it unclear how the report’s 572 
use of ‘increased confidence’ relates to the explication of degrees of confidence in 573 
terms of chances. Better grounding in physical theory is illustrated by the, at least 574 
partly theoretically motivated, inclusion in some GCMs of interactive aerosol modules 575 
(Randall et al., 2007). Illustrations of improved simulation accuracy are given below. 576 
  577 
4.1 Initial condition inaccuracy and the confidence building approach 578 
WG1 AR4 states that many climatic quantities of interest, including those relating to 579 
anthropogenic climate change, are much less prone to nonlinear sensitivity to initial 580 
conditions than weather related quantities and are thus more amenable to prediction 581 
(Le Treut et al., 2007). This relative insensitivity to initial conditions is argued for 582 
primarily on the basis of GCM simulations in which initial conditions are varied. 583 
Notably, CMIP3 multi-model simulations of 20th century GMST, in which ranges 584 
reflect different initial condition runs of participating models, suggest little internal 585 
variability in GMST over periods of decades and almost none over the whole century 586 
(See Fig. 1 and (Hawkins and Sutton, 2009)).  587 
WG1 AR4 acknowledges that confidence in simulations of response to 588 
changes in initial conditions depends on resolving worries about the effects of 589 
relevant model imperfection (Meehl et al., 2007b). But the claim is that these worries 590 
can be mitigated by examining how well GCMs simulate important sources of the 591 
climate system's nonlinear responses, e.g., the El Niño – Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 592 
and the MOC. Thus, the ability of GCMs to simulate observed nonlinear change in the 593 
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Atlantic MOC in response to fresh water influx has been used to argue that they can 594 
produce reliable projections of aspects of 21st century MOC behavior but that 595 
confidence in projections beyond the 21st century is very limited (Pitman and Stouffer, 596 
2006). 597 
 Computational resources, however, only allowed a very limited range of initial 598 
conditions to be explored by CMIP3 GCMs (CMIP3, 2007). As to the question of the 599 
extent to which GCM ability to simulate (in)sensitivity to initial conditions does help 600 
with assessment in light of model imperfection and tuning, it is addressed in the 601 
following sections. Here we only note that the need to address this question has been 602 
made pressing since WG1 AR4. Recent work suggests that GCMs do not adequately 603 
capture the structure of the climate system prior to abrupt changes in the past and are, 604 
in some circumstances, insufficiently sensitive to initial conditions. They can, for 605 
example, only simulate the cessation of the MOC under about 10 times of the best 606 
estimate of actual fresh water influx that has brought it about in the past (Valdes, 607 
2011). There is, in addition, a spate of studies according to which CMIP3 GCMs 608 
substantially underestimate the extent to which 20th century GMST anomalies are due 609 
to internal variability, including initial condition variability, on multidecadal scales 610 
(Semenov et al., 2010; Swanson et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2011). Some work suggests 611 
that the underestimates extend to periods of 50 to 80 years in length (Wyatt et al., 612 
2011). 613 
Recognizing the potential significance of initial conditions to improving 614 
multidecadal CMPs, some recent work aims to take on the challenge of limited 615 
available data in order to initialize simulation runs to actual observed initial 616 
conditions (Hurrell et al., 2009). More extensive exploration of the impact of varying 617 
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GCM simulation initial condition settings is also being carried out (Branstator and 618 
Teng, 2010). 619 
 620 
4.2 Parameterization, tuning and the confidence building approach 621 
WG1 AR4 addresses the difficulty of assessing projection quality in light of tuning by 622 
taking increased simulation accuracy to increase confidence in models only when this 623 
accuracy is not a result of direct tuning, i.e., only when it is not the result of tuning a 624 
parameter for a certain quantity to observations of that quantity (Randall et al., 2007, 625 
p. 596). But tuning can be indirect. GCMs do not possess parameters for GMST 626 
trends, and thus cannot be directly tuned to observations of these trends. Nevertheless, 627 
there is (CCSP, 2009) substantial uncertainty about radiative forcings, and especially 628 
about aerosol forcing, allowing forcing parameters to be tuned to yield close 629 
agreement between simulated and observed 20th century mean GMST trends (Fig. 1). 630 
That this tuning occurs is, as is widely recognized within the climate science 631 
community, suggested by the observation that different models achieve such 632 
agreement by substantially different combinations of estimates of climate sensitivity 633 
and radiative forcing [CCSP, 2009; Knutti, 2008b]. 634 
The difficulty in assessing projection quality in light of parameterization 635 
limitations is partly, if implicitly, addressed by noting improvements in 636 
parameterization schemes since the publication of WG1 TAR. As schemes that 637 
incorporate a better understanding of the climate system and show better agreement 638 
with data become available, we acquire a better understanding of the limitations of 639 
older schemes and increase trust in model performance. Such improvement, however, 640 
leaves open the question of how to handle worries about tuning. Moreover, increased 641 
quality of parameterizations does not indicate how to assess the impact of the 642 
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inevitable remaining underdetermination in parameterization choice on projection 643 
quality. Thus, it remains unclear how accurate CMPs actually are. 644 
 Another strategy that is not explicitly discussed in WG1 AR4, but which is 645 
consistent with the confidence building approach, is suggested by the idea that 646 
grounding in basic theory increases confidence in models. Perhaps, in some cases, the 647 
role of basic theory in generating CMPs is sufficient so as to eliminate, or 648 
substantially reduce, worries arising from the use of parameterizations. It has been 649 
argued that while simulating the feedback effect of increased water vapor inevitably 650 
makes use of parameterizations, this effect is dominated by processes that are 651 
represented by the equations of fluid dynamics and thus will continue to be accurately 652 
simulated by climate models (Dessler and Sherwood, 2009). It has also been 653 
suggested that, since GCMs use the equations of fluid dynamics, our ability to predict 654 
nonlinear MOC evolution that results from its fundamental properties is beginning to 655 
mature, unlike our ability to predict nonlinear evolution it might exhibit as a result of 656 
terrestrial ecosystems (Pitman and Stouffer, 2006). 657 
One difficulty here is how to determine that properties represented by basic 658 
physical theory largely determine the evolution of projected quantities. Insofar as 659 
estimates that this is so rely on – as, e.g., Dessler and Sherwood (2009) rely on – 660 
climate model results, it is assumed that available parameterizations are adequate and 661 
the reliance on parameterization is not bypassed. Further, even if we have managed to 662 
isolate properties that are represented by basic theory and determine the evolution of a 663 
projected quantity, we cannot escape worries relating to the use of parameterization. 664 
Parameterization always plays an essential role even in descriptions of subsystems of 665 
the climate for which we possess basic equations. Basic equation discretization in 666 
GCMs brings with it grid-scale dependent parameterization, e.g., grid-scale dependent 667 
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convection parameterization, of subgrid processes. How this discretization and 668 
associated parameterization affects CMP accuracy, especially in light of how it affects 669 
model ability to simulate highly nonlinear dynamics, needs adequate treatment. 670 
 671 
4.3 Structural inadequacy and the confidence building approach 672 
Increased model grounding in basic physical theory and increased accuracy in 673 
simulation results across a range of such results does indicate increased structural 674 
adequacy. Moreover, confidence building exercises do typically acknowledge a wide 675 
variety of model limitations. What we need, however, are arguments connecting 676 
increased success with the quality of specific classes of CMPs. This includes 677 
arguments addressing the issue of how total remaining inadequacy affects CMP 678 
quality. 679 
Thus, for example, WG1 AR4 offers information such as that more state-of-680 
the-art models no longer use flux adjustments, that resolution in the best models is 681 
improving, that more physical processes are now represented in models and that more 682 
such processes are explicitly represented (Randall et al., 2007). But we need 683 
arguments that connect these successes to an overall estimate of remaining structural 684 
inadequacy and tell us what this inadequacy means for the quality of specific classes 685 
of CMPs. It is one thing to be shown that simulated multi-model mean surface 686 
temperatures are, outside of data poor regions, usually within 2 °C of observed 687 
temperatures, another to be shown how this information bears on the quality of CMPs 688 
of mean surface temperature trends and yet another to be shown how it bears on the 689 
quality CMPs of mean precipitation trends. 690 
While the needed arguments can be further developed, it remains to be seen 691 
how far they can be developed. Further, it is likely that these arguments will, to a 692 
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substantial extent, be based on theory and expert judgment, thus limiting the extent to 693 
which the confidence building approach is model based. 694 
 695 
4.4 The appeal to paleoclimate 696 
An important distinction needs to be made between model ability to simulate 20th 697 
century climate and model ability to simulate paleoclimate. The latter provides 698 
opportunities for out-of-sample testing, as WG1 AR4 notes (Jansen et al., 2007, p. 699 
440). Such testing is of particular significance as it has the potential to help in 700 
addressing the question of the extent to which tuning to current climate is a problem. 701 
Indeed, there is growing recognition of the importance of palaeodata, including of its 702 
importance for model assessment (Caseldine et al., 2010). In this context, there is an 703 
ongoing debate about whether to conclude that GCMs lack representations of crucial 704 
mechanisms/feedbacks because these models have difficulties in accurately 705 
simulating past warm, equable climates with a weak equator-to-pole temperature 706 
gradient (Huber and Caballero, 2011; Spicer et al., 2008). 707 
Although this may change in the future, the burden of assessing models in 708 
light of data nevertheless currently rests firmly on the ability of models to simulate 709 
recent climate. This is so for at least three reasons. First, simulation experiments with 710 
paleodata are still limited. WG1 AR4’s appeal to such simulations is confined 711 
primarily to two instances. WG1 AR4 uses model ability to simulate aspects of the 712 
climate system during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) in order further to support 713 
the claim that models have captured the primary feedbacks operating in the climate 714 
system at the time (Jansen et al., 2007, p. 452). WG1 AR4 also uses model ability to 715 
simulate climate responses to orbital forcing during the mid-Holocene in order to 716 
improve confidence in model ability to simulate responses to such forcing (Jansen et 717 
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al., 2007, p. 459). Second, most of the models WG1 AR4 relies on in generating 718 
projections are not among the models it relies on in discussing paleoclimate 719 
simulations (Schmidt, 2010). And when the same models are relied on in both 720 
contexts, model resolution usually varies across the contexts  (Braconnot et al., 2007). 721 
Practical constraints mean lower resolution models have to be used to simulate 722 
paleoclimate. Thus it is unclear what the paleoclimate simulation successes allow us 723 
to conclude about model fitness for the purpose of generating projections. Third, there 724 
are substantial, unresolved issues about how uncertain paleoclimate reconstructions 725 
are, and thus about what we can learn from them (Snyder, 2010; Wunsch, 2010).  726 
 727 
4.5 Inter-model results, robust projections and the confidence building approach 728 
The confidence building approach is strengthened, both in WG1 AR4 and elsewhere, 729 
by noting that state-of-the-art GCMs provide a robust and unambiguous picture of the 730 
evolution of some large scale features of climate. Such multi-model results are 731 
supposed to increase confidence in projections. For example, state-of-the-art GCMs 732 
predict that GMST evolution will be roughly linear over much of this century, thus 733 
supposedly reducing worries about the sensitivity of such evolution to initial condition 734 
changes and to minor variations in model structure (Knutti, 2008). 735 
How does the appeal to multi-model results help in assessing projection 736 
quality, as opposed to improving projection accuracy? We outline two views about 737 
how it does so and then critically discuss these views. 738 
A common assumption in formal analyses of multi-model ensemble results, 739 
and to some extent in applications of the confidence building approach, is that model 740 
errors are independent of each other and thus tend to cancel out in calculations of 741 
multi-model means (Meehl et al., 2007b; Palmer et al., 2005; Tebaldi and Knutti, 742 
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2007). Indeed, there is empirical evidence that multi-model means are more accurate 743 
than are the results of individual models (see Gleckler et al. (2008) as well as, for 744 
further references, Knutti et al. (2010)). Given the assumptions of error independence 745 
and of error cancellation, one could argue that we can expect a reduction of error in 746 
ensemble means with increased model numbers and thus can take the number of 747 
models used in generating means to be an indicator of CMP quality (Tebaldi and 748 
Knutti, 2007). 749 
In addition, or alternatively, one can assume that ensemble models are to some 750 
extent independent of each other in that they explore alternative model structures and 751 
parameterizations that are consistent with our knowledge of the climate system 752 
(Murphy et al., 2007). Ensemble projection ranges can then be viewed as at least 753 
partial explorations of our uncertainty about the climate system and can thus be used 754 
to tell us something about projection quality. One might suggest, in particular, that the 755 
greater the extent to which the range of uncertainty is explored by an ensemble, the 756 
greater the extent to which the projections/projection ranges it produces are robust or 757 
insensitive to uncertain assumptions and thus the more probable these results are 758 
(Weisberg (2006) describes the general logic behind appeals to robustness). Multi-759 
model ensemble projection ranges are sometimes interpreted probabilistically, e.g., 760 
the range of generated projections is supposed to span the range of possibilities and 761 
each projection is assigned a probability equal to the fraction of models that generate 762 
it (as in Räisanen and Palmer (2001) and, to some extent, in WG1 TAR (IPCC 2001)). 763 
The appeal to multi-model results does not, and is not intended to, address the 764 
issue of tuning or the difficulty of figuring out what to infer about the quality of 765 
specific CMPs from the partial empirical successes of models. Further, worries about 766 
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the use of multi-model ensembles have been raised both within and without climate 767 
science. 768 
Philosophers have pointed out that individual model error can only cancel out 769 
to a limited extent because limited knowledge and limited computational resources 770 
mean that where one model's error is not repeated by another model, the other model 771 
will probably have to introduce a different error (Odenbaugh and Alexandrova, 2011). 772 
Limited knowledge and limited computational resources also mean that substantial 773 
model imperfection will inevitably be shared across models in ensembles (Odenbaugh 774 
and Alexandrova, 2011). Multi-model ensembles in all fields of research accordingly 775 
inevitably leave us with substantial error the impact of which on results is not 776 
estimated. So, while coming to rely on multi-model ensembles might entitle us to be 777 
more confident in projections than we would have been otherwise, it does not appear 778 
to allow us to assign qualities that, like probabilities and informative probability 779 
ranges, involve specifying the full range of possible evolutions of projected quantities. 780 
Climate scientists’ examination of GCM ensemble results confirms that such 781 
ensembles only provide limited improvement in agreement with empirical data and 782 
that much of the remaining disagreement arises from biases that are systematic across 783 
ensemble members (Knutti et al., 2010). For present day temperature, for example, 784 
half of the bias exhibited by the ensemble of models used by CMIP3 would remain 785 
even if the ensemble were enlarged to include an indefinite number of models of 786 
similar quality (Fig. 4). The observation that models share model imperfections is also 787 
acknowledged in climate science research, including in WG1 AR4. Climate modelers 788 
tend to aim at constructing the best models they can for their shared purposes and in 789 
doing so inevitably use shared knowledge and similar technology. As a result, climate 790 
models tend to be similar, sharing many of the same imperfections (Allen and Ingram, 791 
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2002; Knutti, 2010; Meehl et al., 2007b; Stainforth et al., 2007a; Tebaldi and Knutti, 792 
2007). 793 
A related problem is that, although model limitations are extensively examined 794 
in the literature, discussion of the extent to which models in specific multi-model 795 
ensembles differ in ways that are relevant to assessing projections is limited (Knutti et 796 
al., 2010). 797 
Recognizing the limited extent to which model error cancels out, some climate 798 
scientists have suggested that we should not assume that the larger the ensemble the 799 
closer means are to representing reality. Instead, they suggest, one should assume that 800 
the correct climate and the climates simulated by models in an ensemble are drawn 801 
from the same distribution, e.g., from the standard normal (Gaussian) distribution. 802 
Under this new assumption, the failure of an increase in ensemble size to improve 803 
simulation results is no longer interpreted as indicating systematic bias. One can then, 804 
the suggestion is, assume that when a proportion r of an ensemble yield a given 805 
projection, r is the probability of that projection (Annan and Hargreaves, 2010). But 806 
the assumption that model probability distributions coincide with the real climate 807 
distribution cannot be made in general, as is illustrated in the case of the already 808 
mentioned GCM inability realistically to simulate historical Atlantic MOC collapse. 809 
Indeed, structural inadequacy that is known to be shared by ensemble models means 810 
that we know that the correct climate cannot be represented by current models. 811 
Let us now look at the second argument for appealing to inter-model results in 812 
assessing projection quality, the one according to which multi-model ensembles allow 813 
us to explore our uncertainty. Since existing climate models share many uncertain 814 
assumptions, the projections/projection ranges multi-model ensembles produce do not 815 
reflect full explorations of our uncertainty (Parker, 2011; Pirtle et al., 2010). 816 
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Moreover, once again, such ensembles do not allow assigning projection qualities the 817 
assignment of which involves estimating the full range of possible evolutions of 818 
projected quantities. 819 
The GCMs used by WG1 AR4 only sample some of the recognized range of 820 
uncertainty about aerosol forcing, perhaps because of the already mentioned tuning 821 
relating to this forcing. As a result, the spread of estimated temperature anomalies 822 
these models provide (Fig. 1) substantially underestimates the uncertainty about this 823 
anomaly and, accordingly, would be misleading as a guide to projection quality 824 
(Schwartz et al., 2007). So too, if we take the range of natural variability covered by 825 
the simulations represented in Fig. 1 to reflect our uncertainty about natural variability 826 
over the next three decades, we will assign a very low probability to the prediction 827 
that natural variability will substantially affect GMST trends over this period. 828 
Keeping in mind, however, that these models may well similarly and substantially 829 
underestimate internal variability over the next 30 years would lead us to reduce our 830 
confidence in this prediction. Worse, if we cannot estimate the probability that the 831 
ensemble is wrong (something the ensemble cannot help us with!) about internal 832 
variability here, we are not in a position to assign the prediction a probability. 833 
 A number of suggestions have been made within the climate science 834 
community about how partially to address the above worries about the use of multi-835 
model ensembles. Assessments that are explicit about the extent to which climate 836 
models in any multi-model ensemble differ in ways that are relevant to assessing 837 
projection quality should be offered (IPCC 2010; Knutti et al., 2010). If, for example, 838 
internal variability in the MOC is an important source of uncertainty for projections of 839 
mean sea surface temperatures over the next 30 years and our ensemble is in the 840 
business of making such projections, it should be clear to what extent the simulations 841 
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produced by the ensemble differ from each other in ways that explore how internal 842 
variability in the MOC might occur. Assessing projection quality relevant differences 843 
in models is a substantial task, one that goes well beyond the standard multi-model 844 
exercise. 845 
In addition, while limited knowledge and resources, e.g., restrictions to certain 846 
grid resolutions, mean that there is no question of exploring all of existing uncertainty, 847 
provision of second and third best guess modeling attempts could provide a clearer 848 
picture of our uncertainty and its impact on CMP quality (Knutti et al., 2010; Smith, 849 
2006). 850 
 A difficulty to keep in mind is that of determining how a model component 851 
that is shared by complex models that differ in complex ways affects CMP quality. 852 
Assessment of model components and their impact on model performance is a 853 
challenge that is – because of the need to evaluate models in light of background 854 
knowledge – part and parcel of assessing models fitness for purpose. This challenge is 855 
complicated when the projection is generated by complex models that implement 856 
common components but differ in other complex ways. For the same component may, 857 
as a result, function in different ways in different models (Lenhard and Winsberg, 858 
2010). Examining how a parameterization of cloud microphysics affects CMPs may, 859 
for example, be hampered if the parameterization scheme is embedded in models that 860 
substantially differ in other parameterizations and/or basic theory. 861 
 The comparison of substantially differing models will also exacerbate existing 862 
challenges for synthesizing the results of multi-model ensembles. Climate scientists 863 
have noted that synthesizing the results of different models using a multi-model mean 864 
can be misleading even when, as in the case of the CMIP3 models, the models 865 
incorporate only, and only standard, representations of atmosphere, ocean, sea ice and 866 
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land [Knutti et al., 2010]. For example, the CMIP3 multi-model mean of projected 867 
local precipitation changes over the next century is 50 % smaller than that which 868 
would be expected if we were to assume that at least one, we know not which, of the 869 
CMIP3 models is correct. So it seems that using a mean in this case is misleading 870 
about what the models describe (Knutti et al., 2010). Synthesizing the results of 871 
different models may be even more misleading where models differ substantially in 872 
how they represent processes or in which processes they represent, e.g., if some of the 873 
models do and some do not include representations of biogeochemical cycles (Tebaldi 874 
and Knutti, 2007). In such circumstances, for example, a mean produced by two 875 
models may well be a state that is impossible according to both models. 876 
 877 
5. The subjective Bayesian approach 878 
Perhaps the main approach to supplement the confidence building approach in WG1 879 
AR4 is the subjective Bayesian approach. We first consider this formal, 880 
supplementary approach as it is used to assess projection quality in light of difficulties 881 
in parameter choice (Hegerl et al., 2006; Murphy et al., 2004). We then consider how 882 
it has been extended. 883 
 884 
5.1 The subjective Bayesian approach to parameter estimation 885 
A simple, but representative, application of the standard version of the Bayesian 886 
approach to parameter, including projection parameter, estimation involves 887 
calculating the posterior probability distribution function P(F | data, M) using Bayes’ 888 
theorem, as in Eqt. (3) (Frame et al., 2007). P(F | data, M) specifies the probabilities 889 
of values of a parameter, F, given data and a model M. P(data | F, M) is the likelihood 890 
of F and captures, as a function of values of F, the probability that the data would be 891 
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simulated by M. In the Bayesian context, ‘the likelihood of F’ refers to a probability 892 
function for data rather than, as it would on the WG1 AR4 use of ‘likelihood’, to a 893 
probability range for F. The prior probability distribution function P(F | M) is the 894 
probability distribution function of F given only M and thus prior to consideration of 895 
the data. P(data) is a normalizing constant required to ensure that the probabilities 896 
sum up to 1. 897 
P(F | data, M) = P(data | F , M)P(F | M)/P(data)    (3) 898 
 899 
The probabilities in Eqt. (3) are, on the subjective Bayesian approach, to be 900 
interpreted as precise, quantitative measures of strength of belief, so called 'degrees of 901 
belief'. What makes the subjective Bayesian approach subjective is that unconstrained 902 
expert opinion – the beliefs of certain subjects irrespective of whether they meet 903 
objective criteria of rationality such as being well grounded in empirical evidence – is 904 
used as a central source for selecting prior probability distributions. Still, the 905 
subjective Bayesian approach often uses uniform assignments of priors. In doing so, it 906 
borrows from what is usually called 'objective Bayesianism' (see Strevens (2006b) for 907 
a discussion of the different forms of Bayesian approaches to science). 908 
Bayes’ theorem allows us to take existing estimates of parameter uncertainty – 909 
here captured by P(F | M) – and to constrain these using information from perturbed 910 
physics experiments about how well a model simulates data as a function of parameter 911 
settings – information here captured by the likelihood function P(data | F , M). 912 
Assume experts provide prior probability distributions for parameters relating to total 913 
radiative and present-day indirect aerosol forcing and that we calculate the probability 914 
that a model gives, as a function of the parameters' values, to observed oceanic and 915 
atmospheric temperature change. Bayes' rule can then yield posterior probability 916 
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distributions for the parameters (Fig. 5). Bayesian parameter estimation has tended to 917 
rely on models of intermediate complexity and on energy balance models. 918 
The Bayesian hope is that the constraints provided by simulation success on 919 
parameter estimates will increase the objectivity of such estimates. Moreover, Bayes' 920 
theorem provides, what the confidence building approach does not provide, a clear 921 
mechanism that relates simulation accuracy to conclusions about CMP quality, thus 922 
helping to address the problem of what to infer from available simulation accuracy 923 
given the existence of model imperfection. 924 
Nevertheless, the standard version of the Bayesian approach to parameter 925 
estimation faces substantial problems. The standard interpretation of the probability 926 
distributions P(F | M) and P(F | data, M) is that they are probability distributions for F 927 
that are conditional on the correctness of a version of M. In the present context, what 928 
is being assumed to be correct is a model version in which one or more parameters are 929 
unspecified within a certain range. For the goal is to select parameter values from 930 
within a range of such values. Now, it is on the basis of the standard interpretation of 931 
P(F | M) and P(F | data, M) that standard justifications, using so-called Dutch Book 932 
arguments, for updating beliefs in accord with Bayes' theorem proceed. Dutch Book 933 
arguments generally assume that the, typically statistical, model versions upon which 934 
probabilities are conditional are correct. It is argued that, given this assumption, the 935 
believer would end up with beliefs that are not as true as they might have been, or 936 
would incur a financial loss, if his or her beliefs were not updated in accord with 937 
Bayes' theorem (see Jeffrey (1990) and Vineberg (2011) for examples). But if, as in 938 
the cases we are concerned with, the model version upon which distributions are 939 
conditional is not correct, applying Bayes' theorem may offer no advantage and may 940 
be a disadvantage. 941 
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Assume that our subject relies on a CMIP3 GCM to determine whether a 942 
specified fresh water influx will lead to a collapse in the MOC and that the specified 943 
influx is a tenth of that needed to get the model to simulate collapse. Assume also that 944 
some exploration of plausible parameter settings in the GCM does not alter results 945 
substantially. Applying Bayes's theorem on the assumption that the model is, up to 946 
plausible parameter modification, correct means that the probability we assign the 947 
outcome ‘collapse’ is 0. The modeler acquiesces to the theorem. Unfortunately, as we 948 
now know, the model's results are misleading here. In this case, not applying Bayes' 949 
theorem may lead to more realistic judgments. 950 
Thus, the standard use of Bayes' theorem in parameter estimation requires an 951 
alternative to the standard interpretation of its conditional probabilities. We will also 952 
need an alternative to the standard justifications for applying Bayes' theorem. 953 
Even if we have settled on some interpretation of the conditional posterior 954 
probabilities produced by Eqt. (3), there remains the question of what we can infer 955 
about reality from these probabilities. There remains, in other words, the question of 956 
what distribution of probabilities for F, P(F), we should adopt given the conditional 957 
distribution P(F | data, M). We might have a probability distribution for climate 958 
sensitivity that is conditional on the data and a model. But what should we infer from 959 
this about actual climate sensitivity? We cannot properly answer such questions until 960 
we have gone beyond assessing how parameter choice affects projection quality and 961 
have also assessed how structural inadequacy, parameterization scheme choice and 962 
initial condition inaccuracy do so (Rougier, 2007). 963 
Rougier provides a non-standard version of the Bayesian approach to 964 
parameter estimation that has the substantial advantage of allowing us to factor in 965 
estimates of structural inadequacy into subjective Bayesian parameter estimates 966 
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(Rougier, 2007). Nevertheless, his work takes estimates of structural inadequacy as 967 
given and thus does not, by itself, tell us how more comprehensive assessments of 968 
projection quality are to be produced. 969 
Additional difficulties for the Bayesian approach relate to the usage of prior 970 
probabilities. We rehearse two familiar worries about this usage. First, estimates of 971 
P(F | M) are usually made after data that bears on the estimates is in hand and it is 972 
hard to estimate what probability distribution would be assigned to F independently of 973 
knowledge of this data. Failure properly to estimate P(F | M)  may lead to counting 974 
the same data twice, once in estimating priors and once in estimating likelihoods 975 
(Frame et al., 2007). 976 
Second, while some climate scientists have argued that the explicit setting out 977 
of subjective priors by experts is desirable because it makes subjective judgments 978 
explicit (Hargreaves, 2010), philosophers of science have pointed out that it leaves 979 
open the question of the extent to which experts’ views are evidence based and thus 980 
puts reliable and unreliable priors on a par (Sober, 2002). This issue becomes 981 
particularly worrying in the context of climate modeling. We know that prior selection 982 
may be based on results involving tuning and be required even when data 983 
underdetermines parameter value choice. So there is a risk that assigning a prior to a 984 
parameter value will beg the question against alternative choices and thus yield 985 
estimates of climatic variables we are by no means obliged to accept. The worry of 986 
question begging is exacerbated by arguments to the effect that the influence of 987 
likelihoods, and thus of data, on the shape and width of prior distributions is often 988 
minor (Frame et al., 2005). 989 
A common way of trying to minimize the impact of the appeal to expert 990 
opinion is to represent the state of ignorance that existed prior to the consideration of 991 
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likelihoods using uniform prior distributions within expert specified ranges. We have 992 
already seen that uniform distributions are not suitable for representing ignorance. 993 
Moreover, to assume a uniform prior distribution will often be to ignore knowledge 994 
we have of the relative plausibility of various prior assignments (Annan and 995 
Hargreaves, 2011; Rougier, 2007). So too, a uniform assignment of priors for one 996 
parameter will sometimes, because of the non-linear relationship between some model 997 
variables, provide a non-uniform prior assignment to another (Frame et al., 2005). It 998 
has been suggested that best practice given the worries about prior selection is to 999 
provide readers with posteriors as well as likelihoods. This would somewhat clarify 1000 
the role data actually have had in determining posteriors (Frame et al., 2007). 1001 
Another way in which the influence of priors might be minimized is by 1002 
repeated updating of posteriors in response to new evidence over time. As already 1003 
noted, however, evidence with which to test models is mostly limited to familiar 20th 1004 
century datasets. There is thus currently limited scope for successive updating of 1005 
priors. 1006 
 As to the idea that the appeal to likelihoods in deriving posterior probabilities 1007 
will provide an objective constraint on parameter selection, it also has problems. 1008 
Likelihoods measure agreement with data, irrespective of whether such agreement 1009 
results from tuning (Katzav, 2011). In addition, we have seen that an adequate 1010 
assessment of projection quality needs to take into account not only agreement with 1011 
data, but also how error for each simulated quantity develops over projection 1012 
scenarios as a function of error associated with other such quantities. Finally, there are 1013 
various likelihood metrics or ways of measuring agreement with data. Choice between 1014 
these and how such choice affects posteriors is only beginning to be explored (see, 1015 
e.g., Ishizaki et al. (2010)). 1016 
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 1017 
 1018 
5.2 The subjective Bayesian approach and multi-model ensembles 1019 
The subjective Bayesian approach has been extended to assessing multi-GCM 1020 
ensemble output. This extension, which will be called the subjective Bayesian MM 1021 
approach, involves taking an ensemble and producing a statistical model of its 1022 
simulation results. Comparing the statistical model and available data yields a 1023 
likelihood function that captures the probability the ensemble gives to the data. Bayes' 1024 
theorem can then be used, in conjunction with the likelihood function and estimates of 1025 
prior probability distributions for the statistical model’s parameters, in order to 1026 
produce a posterior probability distribution for these parameters (Furrer et al., 2007a; 1027 
Furrer et al., 2007b; Leith and Chandler, 2010; Tebaldi et al., 2005; Tebaldi and 1028 
Knutti, 2007).  1029 
 Some variants of the subjective Bayesian MM approach give each ensemble 1030 
model equal weight in calculating ensemble posterior probability distributions (Leith 1031 
and Chandler, 2010). Other variants weight the contribution of each ensemble model 1032 
to posteriors as a function of how well the model simulates aspects of the climate 1033 
system (Tebaldi et al., 2005). 1034 
Many analyses, e.g., those in WG1 TAR  and some of those in WG1 AR4, of 1035 
multi-model ensemble results produce projections that are just averages of individual 1036 
model results and that have uncertainty ranges which reflect inter-model variability. 1037 
This does not yield probabilistic estimates of multi-model ensemble results. The 1038 
subjective Bayesian MM approach does yield such estimates. The hope is that doing 1039 
so helps to take into account structural inadequacy and limited knowledge of how to 1040 
select parameterization schemes. The subjective Bayesian MM approach does not 1041 
explicitly tackle the issue of how initial condition inaccuracy affects CMP quality. 1042 
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The subjective Bayesian MM approach suffers from many of the problems of 1043 
the subjective Bayesian approach to parameter estimation. The subjective Bayesian 1044 
MM approach faces the problems that arise from the use of prior probabilities. It also 1045 
suffers from the problems relating to the choice of likelihood metrics and the failure 1046 
to take into account how error for each simulated quantity develops as a function of 1047 
error associated with other such quantities. Even weighting models in assessing 1048 
projection quality is not a clear advantage given that the data used to do so may well 1049 
have already been used in model construction. 1050 
Finally, there remain the issues of how to interpret the conditional 1051 
probabilities used in Bayes' theorem given model imperfection and of how the 1052 
conditional probabilities produced by Bayes' theorem relate to unconditional 1053 
probabilities. On the subjective Bayesian MM approach, one updates priors on the 1054 
assumption that the statistical model of multi-model ensemble results is correct. 1055 
However, given that we know that multi-model ensemble results are biased, this 1056 
assumption is false. And any inference from probabilities that are conditional upon 1057 
data and an ensemble to unconditional probabilities can only be made given a full 1058 
assessment of the effects of initial condition error and model imperfection on CMP 1059 
accuracy. We have seen, however, that multi-model ensembles do not provide such an 1060 
assessment. 1061 
 1062 
6. The likelihood approach 1063 
One response to the subjective Bayesian approach’s difficulties with subjective prior 1064 
probabilities is to try to avoid the use of priors all together. This is what the likelihood 1065 
approach does using GCMs. It aims to produce probability distributions for 1066 
parameters solely in light of how well models simulate data as a function of parameter 1067 
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settings, that is solely in light of likelihood functions such as P(data | F, M) (Allen et 1068 
al., 2006). Doing so requires not discounting any parameter settings prior to 1069 
simulation and thus providing likelihood functions that span a much broader range of 1070 
parameter values than is usual. This has become possible, though usually only in 1071 
experiments that perturb the parameters of a single model structure, with the 1072 
distributed computing techniques used by climateprediction.net (Frame et al., 2007). 1073 
The results of such attempts are distributions that are less biased due to those 1074 
parameters that are perturbed, but that are far broader than those otherwise produced. 1075 
An application of the likelihood approach is as follows: we take the climate 1076 
sensitivities of each of a multi-thousand climateprediction.net ensemble of GCM 1077 
variants and estimate the true climate sensitivity to be a weighted sum of these 1078 
sensitivities. The weight of each sensitivity is determined by the probability the 1079 
variant it belongs to gives to observations of a number of climatic quantities, 1080 
including mean sea level temperature, precipitation and surface heat fluxes (Piani et 1081 
al., 2005). 1082 
The likelihood approach can also be used to minimize the impact of structural 1083 
inadequacy and uncertainty about choice of parameterization scheme on CMP 1084 
accuracy. It can do so by producing assessments that are only based on the best 1085 
simulations available for specific parameter settings (Sanderson et al., 2008). But 1086 
focusing on best results does not take into account how they are affected by initial 1087 
condition inaccuracy, tuning or aspects of model imperfection other than parameter 1088 
choice uncertainty. The same is true of what might be called the multi-model 1089 
likelihood approach. This approach uses correlations between GCMs’ predictions of 1090 
trends for a quantity and related observations formally to select the best predictions 1091 
(Boe et al., 2009; Shukla et al., 2006). 1092 
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 1093 
7. Putting it all together 1094 
As we have noted, WG1 AR4 often uses expert judgment that takes the results of the 1095 
approaches we have been discussing, as well as partly model-independent approaches, 1096 
into consideration in assigning final projection qualities. Insofar as final assignments 1097 
are model based, however, the shared limitations of the approaches we have been 1098 
discussing remain untouched. In particular, insofar as final assessments are model 1099 
based, they face serious challenges when it comes to assessing projection quality in 1100 
light of structural inadequacy, tuning and initial condition inaccuracy. Moreover, they 1101 
continue to be challenged by the task of assigning probabilities and informative 1102 
probability ranges to projections. 1103 
 1104 
8. Assessing projections: what else can be done? 1105 
We now examine approaches that differ from those that play center stage in WG1 1106 
AR4. The first approach, the possibilist approach, is described in the climate science 1107 
literature but is primarily non-probabilistic. The remaining approaches are 1108 
philosophy-of-science-based approaches. There are currently four main, but not 1109 
necessarily mutually exclusive, philosophical approaches to assessing scientific 1110 
claims. One of these is the already discussed subjective Bayesian approach. The other 1111 
three are those that are discussed below. 1112 
 1113 
8.1 The possibilist approach 1114 
On the possibilist approach, we should present the range of alternative projections 1115 
provided by models as is, insisting that they are no more than possibilities to be taken 1116 
into account by researchers and decision makers and that they provide only a lower 1117 
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bound to the maximal range of uncertainty (Stainforth et al., 2007a; Stainforth et al., 1118 
2007b). Climate model results should, accordingly, be presented using plots of the 1119 
actual frequencies with which models have produced specific projections (as in Fig. 1120 
6). At the same time, one can supplement projected ranges with informal, though 1121 
sometimes probabilistic, assessments of confidence in projections that appeal, as the 1122 
confidence building approach appeals, to inter-model agreement and agreement with 1123 
physical theory (Stainforth et al., 2007a). 1124 
 Informal approaches to assessing projection quality must address the same 1125 
central challenges that quantitative approaches must address. So, insofar as the 1126 
possibilist position allows informal probabilistic assessments of projection quality, it 1127 
must address the difficulties that all probabilistic approaches face. However, one 1128 
could easily purge the possibilist approach of all probabilistic elements and assess 1129 
projections solely in terms of their being possibilities. Moreover, there are obvious 1130 
ways to develop purely possibilistic assessment further. Purely possibilistic 1131 
assessment can, in particular, be used to rank projections. Possibilities can, for 1132 
example, be ranked in terms of how remote they are. 1133 
The purged possibilist approach would still face challenges. Presenting CMPs 1134 
as possibilities worthy of consideration involves taking a stance on how CMPs relate 1135 
to reality. For example, if we are presented with an extreme climate sensitivity range 1136 
of 2 to 11 K (Fig. 6) and are told that these are possibilities that should not have been 1137 
neglected by AR3 WG1's headline uncertainty ranges (Stainforth et al., 2005), a claim 1138 
is implicitly being made about which climate behavior is a real possibility. It is 1139 
implied that these possibilities are unlike, for example, the possibility that the United 1140 
States will more than halve its budget deficit by 2015. Thus a possibilist assessment of 1141 
projection quality needs to be accompanied by an examination of whether the 1142 
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projections are indeed real possibilities. The same considerations apply to ‘worst case 1143 
scenarios’ when these are put forward as worthy of discussion in policy settings or 1144 
research. The threat that arises when we do not make sure that possibilities being 1145 
considered are real possibilities is that, just as we sometimes underestimate our 1146 
certainty, we will sometimes exaggerate our uncertainty. 1147 
 Nevertheless, the challenges facing purely possibilistic assessment are 1148 
substantially more manageable than those facing probabilistic assessment. To say that 1149 
something is a real possibility at some time t is, roughly, to say that it is consistent 1150 
with the overall way things have been up until t and that nothing known excludes it 1151 
(see Deutsch (1990) for a similar definition). A case for a projection’s being a real 1152 
possibility can, accordingly, be made just by arguing that we have an understanding of 1153 
the overall way relevant aspects of the climate system are, showing that the 1154 
projection’s correctness is consistent with this understanding and showing that we do 1155 
not know that there is something that ensures that the projection is wrong. There is, as 1156 
observed in discussing probabilistic representations of ignorance, no need to specify a 1157 
full range of alternatives to the projection here. Further, state-of-the-art GCMs can 1158 
sometimes play an important role in establishing that their projections are real 1159 
possibilites. State-of-the-art GCMs’ projections of GMST are, for example and given 1160 
the extent to which GCMs capture our knowledge of the climate system, real 1161 
possibilities. 1162 
 1163 
8.2 The critical approach 1164 
The first philosophy-of-science-based approach that is not discussed in the IPCC 1165 
reports and that will be discussed here is the critical approach (Freedman, 2009; 1166 
Longino, 1990). According to this approach, scientific claims are rational to the extent 1167 
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that they result from open, critical discussion. Longino offers a prominent view of 1168 
what such discussion involves. She holds that open critical discussion occurs within a 1169 
community to the degree that the community has recognized avenues for criticism of 1170 
evidence, methods, assumptions and reasoning; the community's members share 1171 
standards of criticism; the community is responsive to criticism and intellectual 1172 
authority is shared equally among qualified members (Longino, 1990). Petersen offers 1173 
what can be thought of as a version of the critical approach, one that is designed to 1174 
assist in, among other things, assessing CMP quality. He provides procedures, and a 1175 
classification of types of uncertainty, that are supposed to help systematizing 1176 
qualitative assessments of model assumptions and thus to facilitate open, critical 1177 
discussion of the quality of model-based-claims (Petersen, 2012).  1178 
The motivation for the critical approach is twofold. On the one hand, 1179 
according to its proponents, critical discussion allows overcoming individual 1180 
subjective bias. On the other hand, there are no available standards beyond our current 1181 
standards by which scientific claims can be judged. So, it is argued, rationality cannot 1182 
amount to more than the application of available standards of critical discussion and 1183 
the acceptance of the deliverances of these standards. 1184 
The critical approach is not really an alternative to the approaches used in 1185 
WG1 AR4. Rather it is a framework that tells us in what conditions the deliverances 1186 
of these approaches are acceptable. Petersen’s framework could, for example, be used 1187 
to guide applying the confidence building approach.  1188 
Further, according to the critical approach, we can recognize that an 1189 
assessment of the quality of a projection is limited while nevertheless accepting the 1190 
projection. For, on this approach, where acceptance of models' fitness for the purpose 1191 
generating projections is a result of open, critical discussion, accepting the models' 1192 
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projections is reasonable even if the discussion in question has substantial limitations, 1193 
e.g., if the impact of unknown structural inadequacy on the projections has not been 1194 
taken into account. The critical approach would thus, for example, warrant trust in 1195 
state-of-the-art GCMs for the purpose of generating the GMST projections presented 1196 
in Fig. 2, subject to expert correction in light of known GCM limitations and provided 1197 
that the trust results from open, critical discussion. 1198 
Acceptance of models' fitness for purpose can, however and as Longino's 1199 
criteria for such criticism state, only be the result of open, critical discussion if there 1200 
are shared standards for assessing fitness for purpose. In the absence of shared 1201 
standards, agreement will be the result of the arbitrary preference of some standards 1202 
over others rather than the uptake and assessment of relevant alternatives. In the case 1203 
of CMP assessment, what we need for acceptance of model fitness for purpose to be 1204 
the result of open, critical discussion is agreement about issues such as whether 1205 
assessment should be probabilistic, whether it should be formal and so on. The present 1206 
paper makes it clear, however, that it would be premature to agree on these issues and, 1207 
indeed, that there is no such agreement. 1208 
 A more general worry about the critical approach is that, by itself, it leaves 1209 
unaddressed the question of when the results of open, critical discussion are reliable 1210 
(Crasnow, 1993). Unless we have an assessment of how reliable current critical 1211 
discussion of model fitness for purpose is, it is unclear why we should accept the 1212 
results of such discussion. 1213 
 1214 
8.3 Inference to the best explanation and climate model evaluation 1215 
The next philosophy based approach to assessing projection quality is the inference to 1216 
the best explanation (IBE) approach (Lipton, 2004). In discussing the confidence 1217 
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building approach we saw model confidence being increased on the basis of 1218 
improvement in model virtues such as agreement with background knowledge 1219 
(including grounding in basic theory), increased realism, agreement with observations 1220 
and model scope – that is, roughly, the number of distinct classes of facts a model 1221 
simulates. An additional model virtue that is appealed to in climate modeling 1222 
(Shackley, 1997) but is not explicitly discussed in WG1 AR4 is simplicity – which is 1223 
directly tied to the number and complexity of model assumptions. Yet WG1 AR4 1224 
does not, recall, tell us how to map combinations of model virtues onto non-1225 
comparative assessments of model confidence. It tells us when confidence should be 1226 
increased on the basis of model virtues but not when confidence should be high. The 1227 
IBE approach does and does so in a way that aims to take structural inadequacy into 1228 
account. 1229 
Theories and models explain phenomena in the sense that they provide 1230 
derivations or simulations that show how phenomena are caused or fit into broader 1231 
patterns of phenomena (Bokulich, 2011). Thus, GCMs can be said to explain GMST 1232 
trends and rising sea levels because the simulations they provide show how these 1233 
phenomena causally depend on anthropogenic greenhouse gas trends. How good the 1234 
explanations of a model or theory are depends on what combination of virtues the 1235 
model or theory has. How good a climate model’s explanations are, for example, 1236 
depends on how accurate its simulations are, how detailed its descriptions of climatic 1237 
mechanisms are, the extent to which it can simulate climate in different periods and so 1238 
on. This allows proponents of the IBE approach to propose that how confident we 1239 
should be in a theory or model depends on how good the explanations it provides are, 1240 
and thus on how good its virtues make its explanations (Lipton, 2004; Thagard, 1978). 1241 
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That is, it allows the proposal that IBE determines how confident we should be in our 1242 
explanations. IBE, as applied to models, is just that form of inference which involves: 1243 
(i) the possession of alternative explanations of a body of data, where 1244 
each alternative explanation rests on a model that explains the data; 1245 
(ii) a determination of which of the available alternative models that 1246 
explain the data provides the best available explanation of the data, i.e., 1247 
of which of these models has the best combination of explanatory 1248 
virtues; 1249 
(iii) an inference to the approximate truth of that model which provides the 1250 
best available explanation, provided that the model explains the data 1251 
well enough (this standard presentation of IBE has been adapted from 1252 
Katzav (2012)). 1253 
Since very successful theories do turn out to suffer from unexpected 1254 
imperfections, even the most optimistic proponents of the IBE approach only allow 1255 
that the very best explanations are good enough. Explanations that are good enough 1256 
are usually identified with explanations that are not only empirically successful, 1257 
simple, of wide scope and well grounded in background knowledge but that also 1258 
provide confirmed novel predictions, that is confirmed predictions of phenomena that 1259 
were out-of-sample when they were made and unexpected at the time. The idea 1260 
behind this stringent definition is that, while it is true that the history of science 1261 
provides examples of successful theories and models that have turned out to be 1262 
fundamentally wrong, those theories or models which generate confirmed novel 1263 
predictions arguably tend to survive, at least as approximations, in later theories (see 1264 
Psillos (1999, pp. 101-111) for a standard discussion). Newtonian mechanics is one of 1265 
the most successful theories ever, and it lead to its share of novel and confirmed 1266 
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predictions. Of course, like the already mentioned Newtonian Earth-Sun models,, 1267 
Newtonian mechanics appears to be fundamentally wrong in many ways. But 1268 
Newtonian mechanics can still be argued to be approximately true. After all, general 1269 
relativity does show that we can recover the central equations of Newtonian 1270 
mechanics given the right approximations. 1271 
 Unfortunately, IBE does not provide a way of assessing the quality of specific 1272 
classes of CMPs from climate model successes. The IBE approach, like the 1273 
confidence building approach in WG1 AR4, provides a way of establishing 1274 
confidence in models as wholes (Katzav, 2012). 1275 
 Further, how accurate a climate model is depends not only on how good its 1276 
explanations are but also on how well its parameterization schemes have been 1277 
engineered to compensate for our limited ability to model climate. So confidence in a 1278 
climate model, or in its fitness for some purpose, should not depend solely on the 1279 
quality of its explanations (Katzav, 2012). As to the question whether, in any case, 1280 
climate models' explanations are good enough to warrant inferring their approximate 1281 
correctness, it is too complex to be addressed here. 1282 
 We also need to note the dispute about whether IBE should be relied on. When 1283 
asked why we should think that IBE allows us to infer the approximate correctness of 1284 
models when the future might provide us with surprises about model imperfection, 1285 
proponents of IBE answer that we can only explain the success of our models by 1286 
supposing that they are approximately true. The success of models would, otherwise, 1287 
be a miracle (see, e.g., Musgrave (1988) and Worrall (2010)). Winsberg, however, 1288 
provides examples of highly successful principles that do not appear to be 1289 
approximately true (Winsberg, 2006). Opponents of IBE point out, further, that the 1290 
justification of IBE is itself a kind of IBE and thus begs the question of whether IBE 1291 
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is acceptable (Laudan, 1981). The justification aims to get us to trust IBE on the 1292 
grounds that the best explanation for the successes of a model is its approximate truth. 1293 
Some, partly in light of the circular justification of IBE, aim to eschew IBE all 1294 
together. Others, accepting that IBE cannot future proof our estimates of how good 1295 
our models are, weaken IBE so that it is a form of inference that allows us to rank 1296 
models according to explanatory capacity but that leaves open the question of how our 1297 
best models relate to the truth. Yet others insist that IBE is fine roughly as it is, 1298 
arguing that it is impossible, on pain of an infinite regress, to provide non-circular 1299 
justification of all basic inferential principles and that IBE is a good candidate 1300 
fundamental principle for justifying models and theories (see Psillos (1999) for a 1301 
discussion of some of these views). 1302 
 1303 
8.4 Severe testing, climate models and climate model projections 1304 
The remaining approach to assessing scientific claims that we will discuss is the 1305 
severe testing approach. The idea behind the severe testing approach is that the 1306 
deliberate search for error is the way to get to the truth. Thus, on this approach, we 1307 
should assess scientific claims on the basis of how well they have withstood severe 1308 
testing or probing of their weaknesses (Mayo, 1996; Popper, 2005; Rowbottom, 1309 
2011). There are a variety of definitions of ‘severe test’. One prominent definition is 1310 
Mayo's (Mayo, 1996; Parker, 2008). It, however, requires that for a test of a claim to 1311 
be severe it must be very unlikely that the claim would pass the test if the claim were 1312 
false, a requirement that very few tests of climate model fitness for purpose fulfill and 1313 
thus which would render the severe testing approach largely unhelpful here. We, 1314 
accordingly, explore the usefulness of the main alternative definition, which is 1315 
Popper's. 1316 
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According to Popper, an empirical test of a theory or model is severe to the 1317 
extent that background knowledge tells us that it is improbable that the theory or 1318 
model will pass the test. Background knowledge consists in established theories or 1319 
models other than those being tested (Popper, 2002, p. 150). Popper offers the 1919 1320 
test of general relativity’s prediction of the precise bending of light in the Sun’s 1321 
gravitational field as an example of a severe test. The observed bending was 1322 
improbable and indeed inexplicable in light of background knowledge at the time, 1323 
which basically consisted in Newtonian mechanics. For similar reasons, the precise 1324 
precession of Mercury also provided a severe test of general relativity. 1325 
A crucial difference between the severe testing approach and the approaches 1326 
pursued by WG1 AR4 is that the severe testing approach never allows mere 1327 
agreement, or increased agreement, with observations to count in favor of a claim. 1328 
That simulation of observed phenomena has been successful does not tell us how 1329 
unexpected the data are and thus how severely the data have tested our claims. If, for 1330 
example, the successful simulation is the result of tuning, then the success is not 1331 
improbable, no severe test has been carried out and no increased confidence in model 1332 
fitness for purpose is warranted. Notice, however, that the fact that claims are tested 1333 
against in-sample data is not itself supposed to be problematic as long as the data does 1334 
severely test the claims [Mayo, 1996]. This is illustrated by the prediction of the 1335 
precession of Mercury. The prediction was not novel or even out-of-sample. It was 1336 
well measured by Le Verrier in 1859 and was known by Einstein when he constructed 1337 
his theory (Earman and Glymour, 1978). Another crucial difference between the 1338 
severe testing approach and those pursued by WG1 AR4 is that the severe testing 1339 
approach is not probabilistic. The degree to which a set of claims have withstood 1340 
severe tests, what Popper calls their degree of corroboration, is not a probability. 1341 
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 How might one apply a (Popperian) severe testing approach to assessing 1342 
projection quality? What we need, from a severe testing perspective, is a framework 1343 
that assigns a degree of corroboration to a CMP, p, as a function of how well the 1344 
model (or ensemble of models), m, which generated p has withstood severe tests of its 1345 
fitness for the purpose of doing so. Such severe tests would consist in examining the 1346 
performance of some of those of m's predictions the successes of which would be both 1347 
relevant to assessing m's fitness for the purpose of generating p and improbable in 1348 
light of background knowledge. Assessing, for example, a GCM’s projection of 21st 1349 
century GMST would involve assessing how well the GCM performs at severe tests 1350 
of relevant predictions of 20th century climate and/or paleoclimate. That is it would 1351 
involve assessing how well the GCM performs at simulating relevant features of the 1352 
climate system that we expect will seriously challenge its abilities. A relevant 1353 
prediction will be one the accuracy of which is indicative of the accuracy of the 1354 
projection of 21st century GMST. Examples of relevant features of the climate the 1355 
accurate simulation of which will be a challenge to IPCC-AR5 models are the effects 1356 
of strong ENSO events on the GMST, effects of Atlantic sea surface temperature 1357 
variations (associated with the MOC) on the GMST and special aspects of the GMST 1358 
such as its late 30s and early 40s positive trends. That these data will challenge IPCC-1359 
AR5 models is suggested by the difficulty CMIP3 models have in adequately 1360 
simulating them (Katzav, 2011). 1361 
The above ideas about applying the severe testing approach will, as a step 1362 
towards their operationalization, be elaborated on somewhat and put more formally. p 1363 
is corroborated by data just in case the data are probable in light of p but improbable 1364 
in light of background knowledge, B. Symbolically, p is corroborated by data just in 1365 
case P(data | B) < 0.5 and C(p | data, B) satisfies 1366 
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C(p | data, B)   P(data | p, B) - P(data | B) > 0    (4) 1367 
Here P(data | p, B) is the probability of the data in light of p and B, and P(data | B) is 1368 
the probability of the data in light of B alone. C(p | data, B) itself results when the 1369 
right hand side of (1) is normalized so as to yield a result that is between 1 and -1, 1370 
where 1 signifies the highest degree of corroboration and -1 signifies the highest 1371 
degree of falsification (Popper, 1983). 1372 
 Now, we want to assign a degree of corroboration to p as a function of the 1373 
fitness of m for the purpose of generating p. So one could identify P(data | p, B) with 1374 
the probability that m gives to data which are relevant to testing m's fitness for the 1375 
purpose of generating p, that is with P(data | q, m), where q is m's prediction about the 1376 
relevant data. One could also identify P(data | B) with the probability given to the 1377 
relevant data by an established rival, m1, to m, that is with P(data | q1, m1), where q1 1378 
is m1's prediction for the data. Thus, in the context of assessing m’s suitability for 1379 
generating p, (4) could be interpreted as: 1380 
C(p | data, m, m1)   P(data | q, m) - P(data | q1, m1) > 0  (5) 1381 
If one's focus is on assessing IPCC-AR5 projections of 21st century GMST, it is 1382 
natural to identify the probability background knowledge gives to data with the 1383 
probability the CMIP3 ensemble gives to them. Accordingly, one could, for example, 1384 
calculate the degree of corroboration of the projection of GMST of a particular AR5 1385 
GCM for the 21st century in light of the model's simulation of data relating to ENSO 1386 
strength by calculating the difference between the probability the model gives to these 1387 
data – P(data | q, m) in (5) – and the probability the CMIP3 ensemble gives to them –  1388 
P(data | q1, m1) in (5). 1389 
How might the severe testing approach help us with the difficulties involved in 1390 
assessing projection quality? The severe testing approach allows us to bypass any 1391 
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worries we might have about tuning since it only counts success that does not result 1392 
from tuning, success that surely does exist, in favor of CMPs (Katzav, 2011). The 1393 
severe testing approach can thus, at least, be used as a check on the results of 1394 
approaches that do not take tuning into account. If, for example, the subjective 1395 
Bayesian approach assigns a high probability to a projection and the severe testing 1396 
approach gives the projection a high degree of corroboration, we can at least have 1397 
some assurance that the probabilistic result is not undermined by tuning. 1398 
Underdetermination in choice between parameters/available parameterization 1399 
schemes might also be addressed by the severe testing approach. Substituting different 1400 
parameterization schemes into a model might result in varying degrees of 1401 
corroboration, as might perturbing the model’s parameter settings. Where such 1402 
variations exist, they allow ranking model fitness for purpose as a function of 1403 
parameter settings/parameterization schemes. Similarly, degrees of corroboration can 1404 
be used to rank fitness for purpose of models with different structures. The resulting 1405 
assessment has, like assessment in terms of real possibilities, the advantage that it is 1406 
less demanding than probabilistic assessment or assessment that is in terms of truth or 1407 
approximate truth. Ranking two CMPs as to their degrees of corroboration, for 1408 
example, only requires comparing the two CMPs. It does not require specifying the 1409 
full range of alternatives to the CMPs. Nor does it require that we take some stand on 1410 
how close the CMPs are to the truth, and thus that we take a stand on the effects of 1411 
unknown structural inadequacy on CMP accuracy. Popper's view is that a ranking in 1412 
terms of degrees of corroboration only provides us with a ranking of our conjectures 1413 
about the truth. The most highly corroborated claim would thus, on this suggestion, be 1414 
our best conjecture about the truth. Being our best conjecture about the truth is, in 1415 
principle, compatible with being far from the truth. 1416 
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 Consider now some of the limitations of the severe testing approach. To begin 1417 
with, while the fact that the severe testing approach is, in some respects, less 1418 
demanding than other approaches has its advantages, it also have its disadvantages. 1419 
Suppose we rank a claim according to degree of corroboration. What does this imply 1420 
for the usability of the claim in research and in decision making? Popper’s suggestion 1421 
that the most highly corroborated claim is our best conjecture about the truth suggests 1422 
a role for corroboration in the context of research. But when is our best conjecture 1423 
close enough to the truth to be relevant to practice, e.g., to decision making (Salmon, 1424 
1981)? Popper’s response is not straightforward (Miller, 2005). However, one can 1425 
make use of Popper’s idea that claims should be assessed by severe tests without 1426 
buying into the rest of his views about science. The beginnings of an alternative 1427 
response is as follows: the overall degree of corroboration of a claim depends not just 1428 
on how the claim has done at this or that single test, but also on how broadly it has 1429 
been tested. A claim's degree of corroboration is thus correlated with the extent to 1430 
which the claim is consistent with the overall way things are and, therefore, with the 1431 
extent to which the claim is a real possibility. A high enough degree of corroboration 1432 
will, accordingly, allow us to conclude that a claim is a real possibility and that it 1433 
should be used in decision making. 1434 
Another basic worry is that our description of the severe testing approach 1435 
presupposes that we are able to determine, prior to using the severe testing approach, 1436 
whether data are relevant to assessing fitness for purpose. This includes sometimes 1437 
being able to determine, independently of the severe testing approach, that inaccuracy 1438 
in simulating a quantity is not substantially relevant to the accuracy of projections of 1439 
other quantities. But being able to provide such determinations is something we 1440 
required of adequate approaches to assessing projection quality. 1441 
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 1442 
9. Conclusion 1443 
There remain substantial difficulties for WG1 AR4’s (climate-model-based) 1444 
approaches to assessing projection quality, particularly because they aim at 1445 
probabilistic assessment. Indeed, worries about probabilistic assessment of projection 1446 
quality are increasingly being raised by those working on projection quality 1447 
assessment (Parker, 2010; Smith, 2006; Stainforth et al., 2007a). 1448 
The commonly used versions of the subjective Bayesian approach leave us, 1449 
because of their limited ability to represent known climate model imperfection, with a 1450 
puzzle about why Bayesian updating should be used. Rougier’s version does allow a 1451 
more complete representation of model imperfection, though it does not actually 1452 
provide us with a way of assessing such imperfection. The likelihood approach was 1453 
only briefly discussed. It is limited to assessment that takes uncertainty about 1454 
parameter choice into account. The confidence building approach has the advantage 1455 
of flexibility. It can, since confidence need not be expressed probabilistically, provide 1456 
non-probabilistic assessments. So too, the argumentation it uses can in principle be 1457 
extended to providing assessments of fitness for purpose, though it currently tends to 1458 
stop at assessing models as such. 1459 
In examining approaches not used in WG1 AR4, we saw that the similarity 1460 
between the confidence building and IBE approaches suggests that IBE might be used 1461 
to extend the confidence building approach. The many who do not share in the 1462 
skepticism about IBE will be tempted to use the criterion of explanatory goodness in 1463 
order to establish the approximate correctness of climate models. At the same time, 1464 
we saw that the IBE approach does not help us to select which CMPs we are entitled 1465 
to be confident in. We also saw that considering explanatory quality alone is not the 1466 
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appropriate way of assessing climate model performance. The critical approach 1467 
provides not so much a way of assessing projection quality as one of systematizing 1468 
such assessments and legitimizing its results. The legitimization it would provide, 1469 
however, is problematic because of the lack of agreement about how to assess 1470 
projection quality and because of the need to address the question of when consensus 1471 
is a guide to truth. 1472 
The possibilist and severe testing approaches are promising in that they 1473 
propose specific non-probabilistic measures of CMP quality. The severe testing 1474 
approach has the additional advantage that it provides a way of trying to get a handle 1475 
on the effects of tuning on CMP accuracy. As we have noted, however, both 1476 
possibilist and severe testing approaches face problems. 1477 
 Some of the difficulties that arise in assessing projection quality are 1478 
difficulties that would arise irrespective of actual projection accuracy. Tuning may 1479 
well not affect the ability of models reliably to generate some important class of 1480 
projections. But our uncertainty about the very practice of tuning means that, even if 1481 
the projections in question are accurate and reliably generated, we will find it difficult 1482 
to decide whether they are accurate. Similarly, the non-linear nature of the climate 1483 
system may well not adversely affect the accuracy of some class of projections. But 1484 
our uncertainty about whether non-linearity is pertinent to the projections will mean 1485 
that we will find it difficult to decide whether they are accurate. This is frustrating, but 1486 
does not alter the predicament we find ourselves in with respect to developing 1487 
adequate approaches to assessing projection quality. 1488 
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Captions 1884 
Fig. 1 Temperature changes relative to the corresponding average for 1901-1950 1885 
(°C) from decade to decade from 1906 to 2005 over the entire globe, global land area 1886 
and the global ocean. The black line indicates observed temperature change, while 1887 
the colored bands show the combined range covered by 90% of recent model 1888 
simulations. Red indicates simulations that include natural and human factors, while 1889 
blue indicates simulations that include only natural factors. Dashed black lines 1890 
indicate decades and continental regions for which there are substantially fewer 1891 
observations. Adapted from Hegerl et al., FAQ9.2, Fig. 1 (2007, p. 703). 1892 
 1893 
Fig. 2 Projected 21st century global mean temperatures changes for various 1894 
greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Solid lines are multi-model global averages of 1895 
surface warming for scenarios A2, A1B and B1, shown as continuations of the 20th-1896 
century simulations. These projections also take into account emissions of short-lived 1897 
GHGs and aerosols. The pink line is not a scenario, but is for Atmosphere-Ocean 1898 
General Circulation Model (AOGCM) simulations where atmospheric concentrations 1899 
are held constant at year 2000 values. The bars at the right of the figure indicate the 1900 
best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six 1901 
SRES marker scenarios at 2090-2099. All temperatures are relative to the period 1902 
1980-1999. Adapted from the  Synthesis Report for IPCC AR4, Fig. 3.2 (2007, p. 7). 1903 
 1904 
Fig. 3 Evolution of the MOC at 30°N in simulations with the suite of comprehensive 1905 
coupled climate models from 1850 to 2100 using 20th Century Climate in Coupled 1906 
Models (20C3M) simulations for 1850 to 1999 and the SRES A1B emissions scenario 1907 
for 1999 to 2100. Some of the models continue the integration to year 2200 with the 1908 
forcing held constant at the values of year 2100. Observationally based estimates of 1909 
late-20th century MOC are shown as vertical bars on the left. Adapted from Meehl et 1910 
al., Fig. 10.15 (2007b, p. 773),  who build on Schmittner et al. (2005). 1911 
 1912 
Fig. 4. Root-mean-square (RMS) error of 1980–99 surface temperature (averaged 1913 
over space, relative to the 40-year reanalysis of the European Centre of Medium 1914 
range Weather Forecast) shown as a function of the number of models included in the 1915 
model average. Panel (a) shows the December-January-February period (DJF), 1916 
panel (b) the June-July-August (JJA) period. Red dashed lines indicate the range 1917 
covered by randomly sampling the models for the subset; the red solid line indicates 1918 
the average. The RMS error converges to a constant value that is more than half of 1919 
the initial value for one model. The black dashed line is a theoretical RMS. If the 1920 
model biases were independent, then the RMS error for a large sample of models 1921 
should decrease with the square root of the number of models (dotted). The blue line 1922 
results if the models are sorted by how well they agree with DJF and JJA 1923 
observations combined, and it indicates that the average of a few good models 1924 
outperforms an average of more models with poorer performance. Adapted from 1925 
Knutti et al., Figs 3(c) and 3(d) (2010, p. 2744). 1926 
 1927 
Fig. 5 Constraints on the radiative forcing from the observed atmospheric and 1928 
oceanic warming. Probability density functions (PDF) for the total (anthropogenic 1929 
and natural) radiative forcing (a–c) and the indirect aerosol forcing (d–f) in the year 1930 
 70 
2000 are based on 25,000 Monte Carlo simulations. The initially assumed PDFs are 1931 
given in a and d. The requirement that the model matches the temperature 1932 
observations strongly narrows the PDFs (b and e). If in addition the climate 1933 
sensitivity is restricted to the range adopted by the IPCC (1.5–4.5 K), the PDFs in c 1934 
and f are obtained. Adapted from Knutti et al., Fig. 2 (2002, p. 720). 1935 
 1936 
Fig. 6. The response to parameter perturbations: the frequency distribution of 1937 
simulated climate sensitivity using all model versions (black), all model versions 1938 
except those with perturbations to the cloud-to-rain conversion threshold (red), and 1939 
all model versions except those with perturbations to the entrainment coefficient 1940 
(blue). Adapted from Stainforth et al, Fig. 2(a) (2005, p. 404). 1941 
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